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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of horizontal mergers on rmsincentives to invest
in demand-enhancing innovation. In our symmetric baseline model, we identify four
e¤ects of a merger on innovation: the innovation diversion e¤ect, the margin expan-
sion e¤ect, the demand expansion e¤ect, and the per-unit return to innovation e¤ect.
The rst two e¤ects are negative, while the third one is positive, and the fourth
one can be either positive or negative. We o¤er su¢ cient conditions for a merger
to reduce or raise incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and synergies,
and provide commonly used models in which they hold. Finally, we show that our
approach can be extended to account for spillovers, synergies in R&D, synergies in
production, and asymmetric demand and cost functions.
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The debate on the impact of mergers on innovation has been recently revived by the
European Commissions decision about the merger between Dow and Dupont.1 This debate
has highlighted several potentially conicting e¤ects of horizontal mergers on innovation,2
and has shown the need for a general theoretical framework that would help to determine
when a merger is likely to reduce or spur product innovation. This paper is a step towards
such a framework.
We investigate the e¤ect of a horizontal merger on demand-enhancing innovation. More
specically, we consider a merger between duopolists and compare their pre- and post-
merger incentives to innovate. This is tantamount to focusing, in a model with more than
two rms, on the initial impetus of the merger (Farrell and Shapiro, 2010; Federico et al.,
2018), i.e., the way it a¤ects merging rmsincentives to innovate for given rivalsbehavior.
In our baseline model, we study the impact of a merger between two symmetric rms
on their incentives to innovate in an environment with no spillovers, no synergies in R&D,
and no or limited  synergies. We derive a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the
merger to reduce the equilibrium level of innovation and provide a decomposition of the
mergers impact on innovation into four e¤ects. First, the merger a¤ects the merging rms
outputs and, therefore, their incentives to innovate in order to increase their margins. We
call this the margin expansion e¤ect. This e¤ect is negative when the merger leads to
lower output by the merging rms for a given innovation level, which is the case when
synergies in production are absent or limited. Second, the merger a¤ects the merging
rmsmargins and, therefore, their incentives to innovate in order to increase demand.
This demand expansion e¤ect is positive as a merger tends to increase margins. Third, the
merger induces an innovation diversion e¤ect : it leads to the internalization of the impact
that each merging rms innovation investment has on the other merging rms demand.
We focus on the case in which this externality is negative,3 as this is the scenario that
competition authorities are most concerned about. Finally, the merger may generate a
change in the return to investment per unit of output, which we call the per-unit return to
innovation e¤ect. This e¤ect can be either positive or negative. Importantly, we show that
the sign of the sum of the demand expansion e¤ect and the innovation diversion e¤ect is
the same as the sign of the di¤erence between the price diversion ratio, commonly used by
1Case M.7932  Dow/DuPont. The European Commissions March 2017 decision is available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7932_13668_3.pdf
2See, e.g., Baker (2007), Katz and Shelanski (2007), Shapiro (2012), Federico (2017), Denicolò and
Polo (2018c), Jullien and Lefouili (2018b) and Régibeau and Rockett (2019).
3This implies that the innovation diversion e¤ect is negative.
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competition authorities to perform upward pricing analysis(Farrell and Shapiro, 2010),
and the innovation diversion ratio, which is its counterpart for innovation analysis (Farrell
and Shapiro, 2010; Salinger, 2016).
Using our decomposition, we provide su¢ cient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise
incentives to innovate. More specically, we show that a merger weakens rmsincentives
to innovate if the innovation diversion ratio is greater than or equal to the price diversion
ratio, and the per-unit return to investment in innovation does not increase too much
after the merger. Conversely, a merger strengthens rms incentives to innovate if the
innovation diversion ratio is less than or equal to the price diversion ratio, and the per-unit
return to investment in innovation increases su¢ ciently after the merger. We then apply
our approach to several standard models, which we categorize according to whether the
innovation diversion ratio is greater than, equal to, or less than the price diversion ratio.
This reveals that in an environment in which there are no spillovers, no R&D synergies and
no or limited production synergies, a horizontal merger reduces innovation incentives
in several commonly used models, but that it can also lead to more innovation in other
standard models.
Finally, we extend our baseline model to account for technological spillovers, synergies
in R&D, (large) synergies in production, asymmetric demand and cost functions, observable
investments, and cost-reducing innovation. In particular, we show that our decomposition
can be adapted in a very natural way to incorporate the e¤ects of spillovers and synergies.
A key insight from our analysis is that synergies in production matter not only for the e¤ect
of a merger on prices but also for its e¤ect on the incentives to innovate. More precisely, the
fact that synergies in production may lead to an increase in output (for a given innovation
level) implies that the margin expansion e¤ect may become positive.
Related literature While there is a vast and long-standing literature on the e¤ect of
competition on innovation,4 the literature addressing the specic question of how mergers
a¤ect rmsincentives to innovate is more recent and relatively small. Motta and Tarantino
(2018) investigate primarily the impact of a horizontal merger on process innovation and
show that a merger reduces merging rmsincentives to invest in cost-reducing R&D in the
absence of spillovers and e¢ ciency gains.5 They also establish that this result extends to
two special cases of quality-improving investments that are isomorphic to cost-reducing in-
vestments. By contrast, we focus on product innovation and consider a very general class of
4See Gilbert (2006) for a recent survey and Schmutzler (2013) for a unied approach to this issue.
5See also Matsushima et al. (2013) for an analysis of the e¤ects of a merger when heterogeneous
oligopolists compete both in process innovation and on the product market.
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demand-enhancing R&D investments. Our paper can therefore be seen as complementary
to Motta and Tarantino (2018).
Federico et al. (2017, 2018) analyze the e¤ect of a merger on product innovation in a
setting where investment in R&D a¤ects the probability of success but not the value of
the innovation, which is the focus of our analysis. They emphasize the negative innovation
externality exerted by each rm on its competitors and show that the internalization of
that externality by merging rms can lead to a decrease in innovation e¤orts under sev-
eral standard demand specications. Denicolò and Polo (2018a) and Jullien and Lefouili
(2018a) clarify further the circumstances under which mergers result in less innovation
when investments in R&D only a¤ect the probability of innovation success, and establish
that mergers can also lead to an increase in innovation incentives in that context. Moreover,
Denicolò and Polo (2018b) show that a merger may increase the merging rmsincentives
to innovate, because it allows them to share R&D knowledge and technologies.
In a setting where rms can undertake more than one research project, Letina (2016)
and Gilbert (2019) show that a horizontal merger can decrease the variety of developed
projects, and Moraga-González et al. (2019) nd that a merger can either increase or
decrease consumer welfare depending on whether the most protable projects are also
the most appropriable ones. In the context of markets with buyer power, Loertscher and
Marx (2019a, 2019b) show that a merger raises rivals investment incentives, and can
raise merging parties investment incentives. Considering an environment with minority
shareholdings, López and Vives (2018) show that increasing partial ownership interest in
rivals can increase incentives to innovate if R&D spillovers are su¢ ciently large. Finally,
Mermelstein et al. (2018) consider a dynamic model in which rms can reduce costs through
either investment in building capital or mergers and show that merger policy can greatly
a¤ect rmsinvestment behavior and vice-versa. There is also a growing empirical literature
on the e¤ects of mergers on innovation,6 whose main message is that those e¤ects are mixed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We lay out our baseline model and state
the equilibrium conditions dening price and innovation levels in Section 2. In Section 3
we present our main decomposition of the overall impact of a merger on innovation, which
we apply to a number of specic models in Section 4. In Section 5 we extend our model to
environments with technological spillovers, synergies in R&D, large synergies in produc-
tion, asymmetric demand and cost functions, observable investments, and cost-reducing
innovation. Section 6 concludes.
6See, e.g., Grabowski and Kyle (2008), Ornaghi (2009), Guadalupe et al (2012), Szücs (2014), Haucap
et al. (2019), and Bennato et al. (2019).
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2 Baseline model
Consider two single-product rms, 1 and 2, producing di¤erentiated goods. The rms
compete in prices and can invest in innovation to increase the demand for their products.
Let c  0 denote the rmsmarginal cost of production and C (i) the investment cost
rm i 2 f1; 2g needs to incur to achieve an innovation level i. We assume that C (:)
is increasing and convex, with C (0) = 0. In our baseline model, we suppose that rms
set their prices and innovation levels simultaneously or, equivalently, that a rm does not
observe its rivals innovation level before setting its price.7
We assume that innovation a¤ects the demand for both products, but not their marginal
cost of production.8 Let Di
 
pi; pj; i; j

denote the demand addressed to rm i 2 f1; 2g
when it sets its price and innovation level at pi and i, and its rival sets its price and
innovation level at pj and j, and assume that demand functions are symmetric, i.e.,
Di
 








pi; pj; i; j

. A rms demand is decreasing
in its own price and decreasing in its rivals price.9 Moreover, we assume that an increase
in a rms innovation level leads to an increase in its own demand and a decrease in the
rivals demand. Our analysis also applies to the case in which innovation by one rm has a
positive impact on the rivals demand (see e.g. Lin and Saggi, 2002) but we will focus on
the case in which the impact is negative as this is the scenario that raises anti-competitive
concerns. Finally, we make the standard assumption that @Di=@pi + @Di=@pj < 0 (i.e.,
own e¤ects dominate cross-e¤ects) at symmetric prices and innovation levels pi = pj and
i = j. We also make a similar (reasonable) assumption regarding the e¤ect of a uniform
increase in innovation levels: @Di=@i + @Di=@j > 0 at symmetric prices and innovation
levels pi = pj and i = j.
10 We summarize these asumptions as follows:
Assumption 1: i) @Di=@pi < 0 < @Di=@pj and @Di=@i > 0 > @Dj=@i; ii) For any
symmetric prices and innovation levels, @Di=@pi + @Di=@pj < 0 and @Di=@i +
@Di=@j > 0:
7Oligopoly models with a simultaneous choice of price and R&D have been studied by Dasgupta
and Stiglitz (1980), Levin and Reiss (1988), Ziss (1994), Leahy and Neary (1997), Cabral (2000), Vives
(2008), and López and Vives (2018), among others. In Section 5.4, we extend our model to the case where
innovation levels are observed before prices are set.
8We consider the case of cost-reducing innovations in Section 5.5.
9See Etro (2019) for an analysis of the way a merger between rms selling complementary inputs a¤ects
innovation.
10Notice that the assumption that @Di=@i + @Di=@j > 0 at symmetric prices and innovation levels
is equivalent to the assumption that an increase in one rms innovation level (starting from a symmetric
situation) has a positive e¤ect on aggregate demand, i.e., @Di=@i+@Dj=@i > 0 at symmetric prices and
innovation levels.
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Consider rst the benchmark scenario in which rms act independently. In a symmetric
equilibrium, the rst-order condition for the pricing decision is:
(p  c) @Di
@pi
(p; p; ; ) +Di (p; p; ; ) = 0: (1)
For conciseness, we assume that this condition denes a unique function ~p () :11 Likewise,
the rst-order condition for the innovation decision is the following:
(p  c) @Di
@i
(p; p; ; ) = C 0 () : (2)
We now make the following assumption regarding the price-innovation game.
Assumption 2: The duopoly price-innovation game has a symmetric equilibrium (p; p; ; )
satisfying rst-order conditions (1) and (2).
Consider now a merger between the two rms, and suppose that the merged entity
keeps selling the two products. For now, we assume away any merger-induced synergies
in R&D, but allow for potential synergies in production. More specically, we suppose
that the post-merger marginal costs of the merging entities are both given by c  , where
  0:We will focus in the baseline model on the scenario in which synergies in production
are either absent or small,in a sense that we will dene below.
The merged entitys (monopoly) prot for levels of investments 1 and 2 is given by
M (1; 2;)  max
p1;p2
(p1   c+ ) [D1 (p1; p2; 1; 2) +D2 (p2; p1; 2; 1)] C (1) C (2) :
We assume that this monopoly maximization problem is well behaved in the following
sense:
Assumption 3: The prot function M (1; 2;) is strictly quasi-concave in (1; 2) :
Under this assumption, the merged entitys optimal innovation strategy is symmetric,
and therefore, we can restrict our attention to a single innovation level for both components
of the merged entity, i.e., 1 = 2 = : For any given innovation level  that applies to both






(p; p; ; ) +
@Dj
@pi
(p; p; ; )

+Di (p; p; ; ) = 0: (3)
11All our results carry over without the uniqueness assumption.
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Let us nally make the assumption that, for a given innovation level, the merger leads
to an increase in prices:
Assumption 4: For any given symmetric innovation level , the merged entitys optimal
prices exist, are symmetric, and satisfy ~pM () > p.
The second part of this assumption means that synergies in production are su¢ ciently
small for their e¤ect on prices to be outweighed by the market power e¤ect of the merger.12
We will relax this assumption in Section 5.2.2.
Turning to the merged entitys innovation choice, the optimal innovation level for given





(p; p; ; ) +
@Dj
@i
(p; p; ; )

= C 0 () : (4)




for the merged entity satises con-
ditions (3) and (4).
The general idea behind the subsequent analysis is to use the rst-order conditions to
eliminate marginal costs and focus on equilibrium prices, innovation levels and demands.
Let us rst dene an independent rms marginal gain from innovation as
h ()   Di (~p () ; ~p () ; ; )
@Di
@i
(~p () ; ~p () ; ; )
@Di
@pi
(~p () ; ~p () ; ; )
:
From (1), one can see that h () represents rm is marginal gain from an increase in
its innovation level i; when its price is set optimally, holding constant the innovation and
price levels of rm j at  and ~p (), respectively.
Similarly, we dene the merged entitys marginal gain from innovation as
hM ()   Di
 
~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; 
 @Di@i  ~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; + @Dj@i  ~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; 
@Di
@pi
(~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; ) +
@Dj
@pi
(~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; )
:
From (3), this expression corresponds to the slope of the merged entitys prot (gross of
investment cost) with respect to i (at i = ); when all prices are set optimally, holding
constant the innovation level of the other unit (at j = ). Based on these denitions, the
following proposition shows that the impact of the merger on innovation depends on the
12This is true in particular in the special (benchmark) case where a merger does not induce any synergies
in production.
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relative magnitude of the pre- and post-merger marginal gain from innovation, evaluated
at the pre-merger innovation level.
Proposition 1 The impact of the merger on innovation, i.e., M   , has the same sign
as hM()  h().
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 thus shows that the merger increases (resp., decreases) innovation if
hM() > h() (resp., hM() < h()).
3 Decomposition of the overall e¤ect of a merger on
innovation
In this section, we analyze the impact of a merger on innovation and show that this impact
is a combination of four e¤ects: the innovation diversion e¤ect, the margin expansion e¤ect,
the demand expansion e¤ect, and the per-unit return to innovation e¤ect.
To highlight the rst e¤ect, we isolate the terms that capture the impact of innovation
in product i on the demand for that product. For the sake of exposition, let us denote the
monopoly output at innovation level  as:
DMi ()  Di
 
~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; 

:
Eliminating the terms related to the impact of innovation on the demand for product j in
the merged entitys marginal gain from innovation hM () ; we dene








(~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; ) +
@Dj
@pi
(~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; )
:
The term h^M () represents the marginal gain from innovation on the sales of product i
for the merged entity. This leads to the following decomposition:
hM ()  h () = h^M ()  h () +HI () ;








(~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; )
< 0:
The termHI captures the internalization by the merged entity of the diversion of sales that
demand-enhancing innovation in one product induces for the other product. This term,
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which we refer to as the innovation diversion e¤ect, is negative because the underlying
innovation externality is negative.
To highlight the three other e¤ects of the merger on innovation, we decompose the
remaining term, h^M   h, which compares the pre- and post-merger incentives to raise the
demand for product i through innovation. Therefore, this term captures how an increase
in market power due to the merger a¤ects the incentives to innovate.
When a rm increases its investment in innovation from i to 
0
i = i+di; the benet
it derives depends on how prices are adjusted. If prices are only slightly adjusted, the
main motivation for innovation is to expand the volume of sales. By contrast, if prices are
adjusted such that the volume is barely a¤ected by innovation, then the main motivation
is to expand ones margin. In this case, a lower supply following the merger reduces the
merging rmsincentives to innovate in order to increase their prices and, therefore, their
margins. We refer to this e¤ect as the margin expansion e¤ect. In the case where prices
are hardly a¤ected by the increased innovation e¤ort, a higher margin following the merger
raises the merging rmsincentives to innovate in order to raise demand. We refer to this
e¤ect as the demand expansion e¤ect.13
More formally, we can write the gain from changing the price and innovation levels









= (p; ), as:
(p0i   c)Di (p0i; p; 0i; )  (pi   c)Di (pi; p; i; )
= (p0i   c) (Di (p0i; p; 0i; ) Di (pi; p; i; )) + (p0i   pi)Di (pi; p; i; ) :
The margin expansion e¤ect outweighs the demand expansion e¤ect if Di (p0i; p; 
0
i; )  
Di (pi; p; i; ) is relatively small, while the opposite is true if p
0
i   pi is relatively small.
Which e¤ect dominates ultimately depends on the price-elasticity of demand at i and 
0
i.
In particular, when this elasticity is not a¤ected by innovation, demand expansion is the
main driver of innovation e¤orts.
In order to dene formally the terms that capture the margin expansion e¤ect and
the demand expansion e¤ect in our model, we dene the (pre-merger) per unit return to
innovation as
g (p; )   
@Di
@i
(p; p; ; )
@Di
@pi
(p; p; ; )
:
This ratio measures the price increase that the rm can achieve when it increases innovation
13This e¤ect was emphasized in the context of coverage for a new technology by Bourreau and Jullien
(2018).
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at the margin and raises prices so as to maintain the volume of sales constant. Therefore,
it can be interpreted as the return to innovation per unit of output. The independent rms
marginal gain from innovation can then be written as the product of the volume of output
and the per unit return to innovation:
h () = Di (~p () ; ~p () ; ; ) g (~p () ; ) :
Denoting Di ()  Di (~p () ; ~p () ; ; ), the impact of the merger on rmsinvestments
in demand-enhancing innovation net of the innovation diversion e¤ect can be decomposed
as follows:













  g (~p () ; )
#
DMi () ;
where the derivatives are evaluated at
 
~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; 

.
The rst term HM measures the e¤ect of the change in output on innovation incen-
tives. We decompose the remaining term into two terms, HD and H, to derive our nal
decomposition:
Proposition 2 The change in innovation incentives induced by the merger can be decom-
posed as follows:







g (p; ) < 0;




~pM () ; 
  g (p; ) 7 0;














and all the derivatives are evaluated at
 




The term HM captures the margin expansion e¤ect discussed above. It is always nega-
tive under our assumption that the merger raises prices (for a given innovation level), i.e.,
~pM () > ~p (). The term HD is always positive and is larger the greater the magnitude
of the derivative @Dj=@pi, which drives the merged entitys incentives to increase prices
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(for a given innovation level) with respect to the situation in which rms set their prices
independently. Since a higher price (and, therefore, a higher margin) provides the merged
entity with higher incentives to increase demand, we interpret term HD as capturing the
demand expansion e¤ect. Finally, the term H captures a per unit return to innovation
e¤ect that measures the change in the per-unit return to innovation due to the merger; it
can be either positive or negative depending on whether g (p; ) increases or decreases
with p.
4 Applications
In this section, we show how our approach can be applied in standard settings. We rst
use our decomposition to provide su¢ cient conditions under which the overall e¤ect of a
merger on innovation is negative (resp., positive) when there are no spillovers, no R&D
synergies, and no or limited production synergies. We then examine the impact of a
merger on innovation under those circumstances in several commonly used models.
Let us rst consider the term HD +HI , i.e., the combination of the demand expansion
e¤ect and the innovation diversion e¤ect. It is easy to see that this term has the same sign















~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; 

. Thus, the sign of HD + HI captures whether the
price externality rms exert on each other (for given innovation levels) is stronger or weaker
than the innovation externality they exert on each other (for given prices). When the price
externality is stronger, the merger induces a relatively large increase in margins, which
leads to a demand expansion e¤ect that is strong enough to outweigh the e¤ect of sales
cannibalization resulting from innovation on rmsincentives.
Similarly, combining the margin expansion e¤ect and the per-unit return to innovation




~pM () ; 
 Di () g (p; ) :
This term captures the incentives to enhance demand for a given product that are not
related to externalities exerted on the other product. Indeed, ignoring these externalities,
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the marginal gain from innovation can be dened as the extra prot on product i for
a marginal increase of innovation i when the price pi is adjusted so that demand for
product i remains constant:





  C 0 (i) = Di (p; p; ; ) g (p; )  C 0 () :
The reasoning above shows that we can separate the overall e¤ect of a merger on
innovation incentives into a part that is related to externalities between products, and
another one that is related to changes in the demand for each product induced by the
internalization of these externalities. Based on this discussion, we now provide su¢ cient
conditions for the merger to reduce (resp., raise) incentives to innovate.
Corollary 1 The merger reduces incentives to innovate if the innovation diversion ratio is
greater than or equal to the price diversion ratio (both evaluated at
 
~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; 

)
and D (p; p; ; ) g (p; ) is decreasing in p. It raises incentives to innovate if the innova-
tion diversion ratio is less than or equal to the price diversion ratio andD (p; p; ; ) g (p; )
is increasing in p.
Proof. Follows from the above discussion.
Consider the su¢ cient conditions under which the merger reduces incentives to inno-
vate. The rst condition is model-specic as there is no reason for diversion ratios to rank
in any given way.14 By contrast, the second condition is more likely to hold than not, as
violating it requires not only g to increase but to increase su¢ ciently to compensate the
decrease in demand resulting from the merger-induced increase in prices.
Corollary 1 shows that a key determinant of the e¤ect of a merger on innovation is
how the innovation diversion ratio compares to the price diversion ratio. Based on this, we
now examine the impact of a merger on innovation in several standard models, which we
categorize according to whether the innovation diversion ratio is greater than, equal to, or
less than the price diversion ratio.
4.1 Models in which the innovation diversion ratio is equal to
the price diversion ratio
In the class of models in which the innovation diversion ratio and the price diversion ratio
are equal, a su¢ cient condition for a merger to reduce (resp. raise) incentives to innovate
is that D (p; p; ; ) g (p; ) is decreasing (resp. increasing) in p.
14This will be conrmed by the specic models we consider below.
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We focus on two commonly used types of models within this class. Consider rst models
with hedonic prices, i.e., for which there exists Q(:; :) and v(:) such that
Di
 








; with v0 () > 0: (HED)
Let Q1 and Q2 denote the derivatives of Q with respect to its rst and second argument.
It is straightforward that the innovation diversion ratio and the price diversion ratio are
both equal to   Q2=Q1; and that
D (p; p; ; ) g (p; ) = v0 ()Q (p  v () ; p  v ()) ;
which is decreasing in p. Proposition 1 then implies that the merger reduces incentives to
innovate under this specication.
Note that in these models with hedonic prices, the impact of a merger on innovation
is driven solely by the margin expansion e¤ect. The reason is that the demand expansion
e¤ect and the innovation diversion e¤ect cancel out and the per-unit return to innovation
e¤ect is equal to zero. A key feature of these models is that their analysis is comparable to
that of models with cost-reducing innovation (Motta and Tarantino, 2018). In Section 5.5,
we conrm this isomorphism by extending our approach to cost-reducing innovation and
showing that the margin expansion e¤ect is the only e¤ect at work for this type of innova-
tion.
Let us now consider the multinomial logit (MNL) model, in which the demand is given
by (see, e.g., Dubé, 2019):
Di
 
pi; pj; i; j

=
expu (i; y   pi)
expu (i; y   pi) + expu
 
j; y   pj

+ expu (0; y)
; (MNL)
where u is increasing in both its arguments, i is the quality of product i, y is income and
u (i; y   pi) is the mean utility from consuming one unit of quality i paid at price pi:












expu (; y   p)
expu (; y   p) + expu (0; y)
at pi = pj = p and i = j = .
The following proposition provides a su¢ cient condition for the merger to reduce (resp.,
raise) incentives to innovate in this case.
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Proposition 3 In the MNL model, the merger reduces incentives to innovate if
 u12 (; y   p)
u1 (; y   p) +
u22 (
; y   p)
u2 (; y   p) < 0
for all p 2 p; ~pM (). The merger raises incentives to innovate if
 u12 (; y   p)
u1 (; y   p)u2 (; y   p) +
u22 (
; y   p)
(u2 (; y   p))2
> 1
for all p 2 p; ~pM () :
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us now provide specic utility functions satisfying the above conditions. First, it
is easy to see that the su¢ cient condition under which a merger reduces incentives to
innovate holds in the case of a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Second, consider the case of a constant marginal utility of income, i.e., u (; y   p) =
v () + f () (y   p), with v0 () > 0; v0 () + f 0 () y > 0 and f () > 0: On the one hand,
we show in the Appendix that the su¢ cient condition for a merger to raise incentives to
innovate provided in Proposition 3 holds whenever
 f 0 ()
f ()
> v0 () ;
which requires that higher quality  reduces the marginal utility of income, i.e., f is
decreasing. On the other hand, it is straightforward that the su¢ cient condition for a
merger to reduce incentives to innovate holds whenever f is increasing.
4.2 Models in which the innovation diversion ratio is less than
the price diversion ratio
We now consider two classes of models in which the innovation diversion ratio is greater
than the price diversion ratio: those with quality-adjusted prices, and those with constant
expenditures.
4.2.1 Models with quality-adjusted prices
Let us rst consider demand functions for which there exists a function Q(:; :) such that
Di
 















Denoting by Q1 and Q2 the derivatives of Q with respect to its rst and second argument,
we assume that Q1 < Q1 +Q2 < 0 and that Q +
p

Q1 < 0, which ensures that innovation
raises own demand. In this setting, pi=i can be interpreted as the quality-adjusted price.
This class of models has been considered, for instance, by Motta and Tarantino (2018).
The price diversion ratio and the innovation diversion ratio at symmetric prices and

















Thus, the innovation diversion ratio is greater than the price diversion ratio. Moreover, we
have

























which may be either increasing or decreasing in prices. Thus, the overall e¤ect of the
merger on innovation is a priori ambiguous: the demand expansion e¤ect is dominated
by the innovation diversion e¤ect (since the innovation diversion ratio is greater than the
innovation diversion ratio) but the sum of the margin expansion e¤ect and the per-unit
return to innovation e¤ect has an ambiguous sign. To evaluate further the overall impact
of the merger on innovations in this model, let us notice that the pre- and post-merger















Q1 (sM; sM) +Q2 (sM; sM)
!
= c  ,
where s = ~p () = and sM = ~pM () =. The pre- and post-merger marginal gains





























(c  )Q  sM; sM
()2
,
respectively. Thus, the innovation incentives (at  = ) are related to the volume of sales,
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and, more precisely, to total variable production costs. Therefore, under this specication,
any merger that would reduce output or total variable costs for a xed innovation level
reduces incentives to innovate.15
4.2.2 Models with constant expenditures/CES
Let us now consider the class of models with constant expenditures (see Vives, 1999). In























+  < 0;
where the last condition ensures that goods are substitutes. Here, K represents spending
on other goods, so that total spending p1 (p1; 1) + p2 (p2; 2) + K is constant. In the
special case of a CES demand function with substitutable goods, we have





with  > 1: (CES)





















where the inequality follows from @
@p
< 0: Thus, using Corollary 1, we conclude that the
merger reduces innovation if D (p; p; ; ) g (p; ) is decreasing in p: This leads to the
following statement.
Corollary 2 In a model with constant expenditures (CE), the merger reduces incentives








is non-decreasing in p: This holds in
particular for the CES demand.
Proof. See Appendix.
15Motta and Tarantinos analysis shows through a direct argument that absent any production synergies,
the overall e¤ect of the merger on innovation is negative under this specication.
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4.3 Models in which the innovation diversion ratio is less than
the price diversion ratio
We now examine the impact of a merger on innovation in two models in which the inno-
vation diversion ratio is lower than the price diversion ratio.
4.3.1 Model with quality-augmented linear demand
Let us consider the following linear demand system, considered by Sutton (1997, 1998),
Symeonidis (2000, 2003) and Federico et al. (2018):
Di
 





2i (1  pi)  j (1  pj)

4  2 ;
where  2 (0; 2) is an inverse measure of the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation, and i is
the quality of product i.
The price diversion ratio and the innovation diversion ratio at symmetric prices and











(p; p; ; )
@Di
@i




respectively, which implies that the price diversion ratio is greater than the innovation
diversion ratio. Moreover, we nd in this case that
D (p; p; ; ) g (p; ) =

2 + 
(4  ) (1  p)2
2
,
which is decreasing in p. Thus, we have on the one hand, HD +HI > 0, and on the other
hand, HM + H < 0. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of a merger on innovation is a priori
ambiguous.
To determine the overall impact of the merger, note that the pre- and post-merger
prices for a given (symmetric) level of innovation  are16
ep () = c+ (1  c) 2  
4   and epM() = 1 + c2 ;
respectively.17 Interestingly, p () and pM() do not depend on the innovation level . This
16See Symeonidis (2003) for the derivation of equilibrium prices.
17We ignore any post-merger production synergies post-merger, i.e., we set  = 0.
17
implies in particular that innovation is monetized only through an increase in demand by
the merged entity,18 and that the demand expansion e¤ect plays a key role this model.












Thus, the demand expansion e¤ect is not strong enough to outweigh the other e¤ects, and
the merger always reduces incentives to innovate in this model.
4.3.2 Singh-Vives model with endogenous horizontal and vertical di¤erentia-
tion
We investigate the e¤ect of a merger on innovation in the linear demand model of Singh and
Vives (1984) in a context where innovation has both a horizontal and a vertical dimension.
Assume that the utility of the representative consumer is given by
U(q1; q2;m) = a1q1 + a2q2   (q21 + q22)=2  q1q2 +m;
where (q1; q2) is the vector of quantities, m is the numeraire good, and  2 [0; 1] represents
the degree of substitutability between the product of rm 1 and the product of rm 2.
Products are independent if  = 0 and perfect substitutes if  = 1.
Suppose that R&D raises product quality as in the model with hedonic prices, which
we capture by assuming that ai = a (i) = + i:We also assume that R&D allows rms
to increase the di¤erentiation between their products as in Lin and Saggi (2002). Formally,
the degree of substitutability is given by (1; 2) = 1   (1 + 2), and we suppose that
R&D costs are su¢ ciently high so that  (1 + 2) < 1 in equilibrium (i.e., 2 < 1 in the
symmetric equilibrium).
The demand for rm i is then given by
Di
 







  pi + pj
1  2 :
To ensure that the innovation diversion e¤ectHI is negative we assume that the parameters





is increasing in i (see Symeonidis, 2003), the equilibrium demand of a rm is increasing in its
quality level.
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of the model are such that
a () 
2(1  )(1  2) < : (6)
Under this specication, straightforward computations show that the innovation diversion
ratio is less than the price diversion ratio:
HD +HI =
a ()2
8(1  ) > 0:
Moreover, g (p; ) = (a() p)
2
1  +  : As g
 (p; ) is decreasing in p, we have H+HM < 0.
Hence, the overall e¤ect of the merger is a priori ambiguous. However, combining all the
e¤ects, we nd that
HM +HD +HI +H =
a () (1  2)
4(1  )(1 + 2)

a () (1 + 422)
2(1  )(1  422)   

; (7)
which implies that the merger leads to an increase in incentives to innovate if = is not
too small.
Proposition 4 In the augmented Singh and Vives model with a negative innovation diver-
sion e¤ect, the merger raises incentives to innovate if the vertical e¤ect of R&D investments
is not too strong (i.e.,  is not too large, given ,  and ), if there is little di¤erentiation
between products ( is small, given  ,  and ), or if demand is large enough ( is large,
given ,  and ).
Proof. See Appendix.
We should emphasize that condition (6), which ensures that the innovation diversion
e¤ect is negative, is compatible with expression (7) being positive.19 In other words, the
set of parameters for which the merger has a positive impact on innovation is not empty.
5 Extensions
In this section, we show how the approach we developed in our baseline model can be
extended to account for technological spillovers, synergies in R&D, (large) synergies in
production, asymmetric demand and cost functions, and observable investments. We also






provide an extension in which we investigate the impact of a merger on investments in
cost-reducing innovation.
5.1 Technological spillovers
It is well known that a rms R&D may benet its rivals through technological spillovers
(dAspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Bloom et al., 2013; López and Vives, 2018). To
capture this, let us now assume that there exists a degree of spillovers  2 [0; 1] such that
the demand addressed to rm i is given by Di
 
pi; pj; i + j; j + i

. In other words,
a share  of the demand-enhancing innovation e¤orts of rm i spills over to rm j (and
vice versa).
Let ^i  i+j for i = 1; 2 and ^  (1 + ) , and denote (p^; ^) the (symmetric) pre-
merger equilibrium level of innovation. The following statement shows that Proposition 1
extends in a very natural way to the scenario in which there are spillovers.
Proposition 5 In the presence of spillovers, the impact of the merger on innovation has
the same sign as hM (^
)   h (^), where hM (:) and h (:) are obtained from hM (:) and















- and replacing the arguments (~p () ; ~p () ; ; ) and
 
~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; 

with (~p (^) ; ~p (^) ; ^; ^)
and
 




We can again provide a decomposition of the overall impact of the merger on incentives
to innovate into several e¤ects:
hM (^
)  h (^) = HM +HD +HI +H + E
where HM, HD, HI, and H are obtained from HM , HD, HI , and H, respectively, by
making the replacements specied in Proposition 5, and













The terms HM, HD, HI, H capture the margin expansion e¤ect, the demand expan-
sion e¤ect, the innovation diversion e¤ect, and the per-unit return to innovation e¤ect,
respectively, as in the baseline model. The additional term E captures a new spillover
20
e¤ect, and is positive.20
Furthermore, we nd that the sum of the innovation diversion e¤ect, the demand ex-


















spillover-adjusted innovation diversion ratio
The denominator of the spillover-adjusted innovation diversion ratio is always positive.
This follows from the assumptions that  2 [0; 1] and @Di=@^i + @Di=@^j > 0. Thus, the
sign of the spillover-adjusted innovation diversion ratio is given by the sign of the di¤erence























Considering an environment with no price competition, Salinger (2016) shows that a merger
reduces innovation if and only if NIP > 1: It is straightforward to see that this condition





5.2.1 Synergies in R&D
We rst consider the case where the merger induces synergies that reduce the cost of R&D
investments.21 Let us assume that the post-merger cost of R&D is given by C()
1+
, where















@Di=@pi + @Di=@pj is negative and @Di=@^i + @Di=@^j is positive.
21Davidson and Ferrett (2007) emphasize the importance of R&D synergies in shaping the protability
of a merger. In contrast, we focus on how they a¤ect innovation e¤orts.
21
  0 is a measure of the size of R&D synergies. The only rst-order condition that is
a¤ected by R&D synergies is the one associated with the merged entitys innovation level,
i.e., Equation (4), which becomes22




(p; p; ; ) +
@Dj
@i
(p; p; ; )

= C 0 () :
The equilibrium price and the monopoly price for a given (symmetric) innovation level
are still given by ~p () and ~pM (), respectively. The result in Proposition 1 can then be
extended as follows.
Proposition 6 In the presence of R&D synergies of size , the impact of the merger on
innovation has the same sign as (1 + )hM ()  h ().
We can decompose the impact of the merger on innovation into the same four e¤ects
that are at play in the baseline model. We have:
(1 + )hM ()  h () = HM +HD +HI +H:
The terms HM and H, which represent the margin expansion e¤ect and the return to
innovation e¤ect, respectively, remain the same as in the baseline model, while the two
other terms must be adjusted as follows:
















The sum of the adjusted demand expansion and innovation diversion e¤ects, HD +HI,
has the same sign as the di¤erence between a synergy-adjusted price diversion ratio and






1 + | {z }








22To simplify the exposition, we abstract from any production synergies and set  to zero.
22
Note that, since @Di=@pi+ @Di=@pj < 0 from our assumptions, the synergy-adjusted price
diversion ratio is increasing in .
5.2.2 Synergies in production
We now show that when there are strong synergies in production, they inuence not only
the e¤ect of the merger on prices but also its e¤ect on innovation. Recall that we have
assumed that the merger generates synergies that allow the merging rms to decrease their
marginal cost by  2 [0; c]. Using Equation (3), we obtain an optimal price for the merged
entity, ~pM (; ), where we now make the dependence on  explicit. While we have focused
so far on the case where ~pM (; ) > ~p () (Assumption 4), the opposite may be true if
synergies are strong enough.
Let us make the natural assumption that ~pM (; ) is decreasing in . Suppose further-
more that there exists ~ () 2 (0; c) such that ~pM (; ~ ()) = p (). Then, if produc-
tion synergies are su¢ ciently strong (i.e.,  > ~ ()), the post-merger price ~pM (; ) is
smaller than the pre-merger price ~p (). In other words, e¢ ciencies in production out-
weigh the market power e¤ect of the merger. Given (3) and (4), and the fact that the
pre-merger outcome is not a¤ected by merger-induced synergies, Proposition 1 still holds
for ~pM (; ) < ~p () and our decomposition remains valid as well. A key di¤erence with
the baseline model, however, is that the margin expansion e¤ect, HM , is positive if produc-
tion synergies are strong enough so that the monopoly price is smaller than the competitive
price at the pre-merger innovation level, i.e., if  > ~ (). If this condition holds, and g is
monotonic in p, the term H representing the per-unit return to innovation e¤ect, is also
of the opposite sign compared to the baseline model.
In the special case where  = ~ (), i.e., when the pre- and post-merger prices are
identical if the innovation level is set at its pre-merger level , we have HM = H = 0.
This leads us to the following result, which shows that when the merger has a neutral e¤ect
on prices (for an innovation level xed at its pre-merger value), its impact on innovation
can be derived from the mere comparison of the price diversion ratio and the innovation
diversion ratio.
Proposition 7 Suppose that  = ~ (). Then, the merger reduces (resp., raises) incen-
tives to innovate if the price diversion ratio is greater (resp., less) than the innovation
diversion ratio, where both ratios are evaluated at
 




5.3 Asymmetric demand and cost functions
We now extend our analysis to a setting in which the demand functions Di, the marginal
costs ci and the innovation cost functions Ci are potentially asymmetric.
Consider rst the pre-merger situation. Assume that the pricing game derived from
the price-innovation game by xing the innovation levels of rms 1 and 2 to 1 and
2, respectively, has a unique equilibrium. The corresponding equilibrium price pair
(~p1 (1; 2) ; ~p

2 (1; 2)) is the solution to the following system of rst-order conditions:(
(p1   c1) @D1@p1 (p1; p2; 1; 2) +D1 (p1; p2; 1; 2) = 0
(p2   c2) @D2@p2 (p1; p2; 1; 2) +D2 (p1; p2; 1; 2) = 0:
(8)
Likewise, assume that the innovation game derived from the price-innovation game by
xing the prices of rms 1 and 2 to p1 and p2, respectively, has a unique symmetric equi-
librium. The corresponding equilibrium pair of innovation levels (~1 (p1; p2) ; ~

2 (p1; p2)) is
the solution to the following system of rst-order conditions:(
(p1   c1) @D1@1 (p1; p2; 1; 2) = C
0
1 (1)




Consider now the post-merger situation. As in the baseline model, we assume away any
merger-induced synergies in R&D but allow for potential merger-induced synergies in pro-
duction. More specically, we suppose that the post-merger production costs of the two
merging entities are given by c1 1 and c2 2, respectively, where 1 and 2 are small
in a sense that will be made clear later.
For any given innovation levels 1 and 2, the merged entitys optimal price pair 




is dened by the following system of rst-order conditions:(
(p1   c1 + 1) @D1@p1 (p1; p2; 1; 2) + (p2   c2 + 2) @D2@p1 (p1; p2; 1; 2) +D1 (p1; p2; 1; 2) = 0
(p1   c1 + 1) @D1@p2 (p1; p2; 1; 2) + (p2   c2 + 2) @D2@p2 (p1; p2; 1; 2) +D2 (p1; p2; 1; 2) = 0:
Combining these two equations leads to8>><>>:



























We can now state the counterparts to Assumptions 2-4 in the current setting.
24







satisfying rst-order conditions (8) and (9).
Assumption 3: The prot functionM (1; 2;1; 2) is strictly quasi-concave in (1; 2) ;where
M (1; 2;1; 2) is the merged entitys (monopoly prot) for levels of investments
1 and 2:
M (1; 2;1; 2)  max
p1;p2
f(p1   c1 + 1)D1 (p1; p2; 1; 2) +
(p2   c2 + 2)D2 (p2; p1; 2; 1)  C (1)  C (2)g:
Assumption 4: For any given innovation levels 1 and 2, the merged entitys optimal
prices exist and are such that ~pM1 (1; 2) > ~p

1 (1; 2) and ~p
M
2 (1; 2) > ~p

2 (1; 2).
The independent rms marginal gain from innovation is now given by





for rm i = 1; 2, where all functions are evaluated (~p1 (1; 2) ; ~p

2 (1; 2) ; 1; 2), while the
merged entitys marginal gain from innovation in product i = 1; 2 is



























where all functions are evaluated at
 
~pM1 (1; 2) ; ~p
M
2 (1; 2) ; 1; 2

:
Finally, we assume that the pre-merger and post-merger net benets from innovation in
product i, i.e., hi (1; 2) C 0(i) and hMi (1; 2) C 0(i), are decreasing in i. Moreover,
we say that the pre-merger (resp. post-merger) innovation e¤orts are strategic complements
if h1 (1; 2) (resp., h
M
1 (1; 2)) is increasing in 2 and h

2 (1; 2) (resp., h
M
2 (1; 2)) is
increasing in 1:
The next proposition shows that when innovation e¤orts are strategic complements,
the comparison of an independent rms marginal gain from innovation and the merged
entitys marginal gain from innovation (as dened above) is still informative regarding the
impact of the merger on innovation.
Proposition 8 (i) If the pre-merger innovation e¤orts are strategic complements and
hMi (1; 2) < h

i (1; 2) for i = 1; 2 and any (1; 2), then the merger leads to less in-
novation in both products, i.e., Mi < 

i for i = 1; 2.
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(ii) If the post-merger innovation e¤orts are strategic complements and hMi (1; 2) >
hi (1; 2) for i = 1; 2 and any (1; 2), then the merger leads to more innovation in both
products, i.e., Mi > 

i for i = 1; 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
As an illustration, we provide in the Appendix a su¢ cient condition under which the
post-merger innovation e¤orts are strategic complements in the Singh-Vives model with
endogenous horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation.
5.4 Observable investments
In the baseline model, we assumed that the price and innovation decisions were taken
simultaneously by the rms, or equivalently, that a rm could not observe its rivals invest-
ment before setting its price. We now assume that a rms investment in R&D is observed
by its rival before prices are set. For given investment levels, the prot-maximizing price




, is the solution to the following rst-order condition:
(pi   c) @Di
@pi
 




pi; pj; i; j

= 0.











= C 0 (i) , (10)












and @~pj=@i is evaluated at 
i; j

. Therefore, rm i takes into account not only the direct e¤ect of its investment on
its prot, but also the strategic e¤ect that goes through rm js pricing reaction. The rst-
order conditions associated to the merged entitys maximization program remain the same
as before. Therefore, the decomposition in our baseline setting remains valid as long as we
replace the partial derivative @Di=@i by @Di=@i+@~p

j=@i@Di=@pj in the independent
rms marginal gain from innovation. This leads us to the following decomposition:
hM ()  h () = HM +HD +HI +H +HO,
where





The sign of the additional term HO is the opposite of the sign of the strategic e¤ect on
the rivals price, @~pj=@i. It seems natural to assume that when rm i invests more in
innovation, rm j reacts by setting a lower price. In the Appendix, we provide su¢ cient
conditions on rmsdemand functions which ensure that @~pj=@i  0. In this case, the
last term of the decomposition, HO, is positive. Compared to the baseline model, when
investment is observable, a merger allows rms to internalize the negative strategic e¤ect
of their investments on prots, which tends to stimulate innovation.
5.5 Cost-reducing innovation
In this extension, we depart from the baseline framework by applying our approach to
cost-reducing innovation. Let us denote by Di (pi; pj) the demand addressed to rm i,
and assume that rm i can reduce its marginal cost from an initial level c to c   i, by
investing C (i). As in the baseline model with demand-enhancing innovation, we assume
that the duopoly price-innovation game has a unique, symmetric, equilibrium and that
the equilibrium innovation level  is positive. Also, denoting by   0 the synergies in
production induced by the merger, suppose that the prot function of the merged entity
with optimized prices, i.e.,
M (1; 2;) = max
p1;p2
(p1   c+  + 1)D1 (p1; p2)+(p2   c+  + 2)D2 (p1; p2) C (1) C (2) ,
is strictly quasi-concave in (1; 2), and that for a given symmetric innovation level , the
merger leads to higher prices, i.e., ~pM () > ~p () (with similar notations as in our baseline
model).
Under these assumptions, the merged entitys innovation strategy is symmetric. The
key di¤erence with the baseline model is that the rst-order condition which gives the
equilibrium innovation level as a function of the symmetric equilibrium price is the same
whether rms act independently or as a merged entity. This condition is given by
Di (p; p) = C
0 () : (11)
Therefore, the marginal gain from innovation is Di () = Di (~p
 () ; ~p ()) if rms act
independently and DMi () = Di
 
~pM () ; ~pM ()

if they merge. The strict quasi-concavity
of M (:; :) then ensures that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the merger to reduce
innovation is that DMi (
) Di () is negative. This term captures the margin expansion
e¤ect in the present setting.23 It is indeed negative, as the merger leads to higher prices,
23The only di¤erence between the margin expansion e¤ect in the cost-reducing innovation setting and
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i.e., ~pM () > ~p () (by assumption), which reduces the demand addressed to each rm
(since @Di=@pi+@Di=@pj < 0 at symmetric prices). Thus, contrary to the case of demand-
enhancing innovation, the margin expansion e¤ect is the only e¤ect driving the impact of a
merger on cost-reducing innovation. This conrms Motta and Tarantinos clear-cut result
that a merger to monopoly reduces the incentives to conduct cost-reducing investments
when they are not observable to rivals.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis sheds light on the impact of a merger on investment in demand-enhancing
innovation. In our baseline model with no spillovers, no synergies in R&D and no or lim-
ited synergies in production, we identied the following four e¤ects of a merger between
symmetric duopolists on their incentives to innovate: the margin expansion e¤ect which
is particularly relevant when innovation raises margins but has little e¤ect on the volume
of sales, the demand expansion e¤ect which is key when innovation raises demand but has
little e¤ect on margins, the innovation diversion e¤ect that arises whenever innovation
a¤ects sales of other products, and the per-unit return to innovation e¤ect which appears
whenever the merger a¤ects the gain from innovation per unit of output. Using this decom-
position, we provided su¢ cient conditions under which the overall impact on innovation
incentives is negative. It turns out that the impact of a horizontal merger on innovation
depends crucially, albeit not solely, on the comparison between the price diversion ratio
and innovation diversion ratio, which calls for a distinction between environments in which
the innovation diversion ratio is greater than the price diversion ratio and environments
in which the reverse holds. Our analysis of several standard models suggests that in the
former class of environments, the impact of a merger on innovation is likely to be negative
in the absence of spillovers and synergies, while in the latter the impact can be either
positive or negative.
One advantage of our approach is that it can be easily extended to account for spillovers,
synergies in R&D, and synergies in production and can also be adapted to cost-reducing
innovation. We leave for future research the extension of our analysis to a setting with
N  3 rms in which a subset of rms merge. That would allow us to investigate the
e¤ect of a merger on merging and non-merging rmsincentives to innovate (incorporating
equilibrium e¤ects). Finally, while the e¤ect of mergers on innovation is interesting in
itself, the ultimate question that most competition authorities are seeking to answer when
our baseline demand-enhancing innovation setting is that rms increase their margins by decreasing their
marginal costs instead of increasing their prices.
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evaluating a merger is its e¤ect on consumer surplus. Therefore, it would be interesting to
embed our analysis in a full-edged assessment of the impact of a merger on consumers.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
From the positivity of , and from (1) and (2), it follows that h () = C 0 ().
Moreover, from (3) and (4), it follows that d
M
d
(; ) = 2

hM ()  C 0 (). Assumption
2 implies that M >  if and only if d
M
d
(; ) > 0, which yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 2
We have




















































~pM () ; 



















h^M () +H = HD +H;
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
In a model with an MNL demand, we have
g (p; ) =
u1 (; y   p)
u2 (; y   p)
and, therefore,
g (p; )D (p; p; ; ) =
u1 (; y   p) expu (; y   p)
2u2 (; y   p) exp u (; y   p) + u2 (; y   p) expu (0; y) :
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Hence, the derivative of g (p; )D (p; p; ; ) with respect to p has the same sign as
[  (u12 + u1u2) (; y   p)] expu (; y   p) [2u2 (; y   p) exp u (; y   p) + u2 (; y   p) exp u (0; y)]
 u1 (; y   p) expu (; y   p) f[ 2 (u22 + u22) (; y   p)] expu (; y   p)  u22 (; y   p) exp u (0; y)g,
which has the same sign as
[2 ( u12u2 + u1u22) (; y   p)] expu (; y   p)+

( u12u2   u1u22 + u1u22) (; y   p)

expu (0; y) :
If u1u22 u12u2 < 0 or, equivalently,  u12=u1+u22=u2 < 0, then both the rst term between
brackets and the second term between brackets are negative and, therefore, g (p; )D (p; p; ; )
decreases with p. Corollary 1 then implies that the merger reduces incentives to innovate.
If  u12u2  u1u22+ u1u22 > 0 or, equivalently,  u12= (u1u2) + u22= (u2)2 > 1, then both the
rst term between brackets and the second term between brackets are positive and, there-
fore, g (p; )D (p; p; ; ) increases with p. Corollary 1 then implies that the merger
reduces incentives to innovate.
Condition for the merger to raise incentives to innovate in the case of a utility
with constant marginal utility of income
In the special case u (; y   p) = v () + f () (y   p), the su¢ cient condition under
which the merger raises incentives to innovate writes
 f () f[v0 () + f 0 () (y   p)] f () + f 0 ()g > 0,
for all p 2 p; ~pM (), which holds if and only if
[v0 () + f 0 () (y   p)] f () + f 0 () < 0
for all p 2 p; ~pM (). For this inequality to hold, it is necessary that f 0 () < 0.
Using this, it is easy to see that a su¢ cient condition for the inequality to hold is that
v0 () f () + f 0 () < 0, which we can write as
 f 0 ()
f ()
> v0 () :
Proof of Corollary 2
From Proposition 1 and the fact that the innovation diversion ratio is larger than the
price diversion ratio, a merger reduces innovation if D (p; p; ; ) g (p; ) is decreasing in
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prices. We have
D (p; p; ; ) g (p; ) =
1
2p +K
(p +K)  @
@

































K (K2 + x2 (   1) + 2Kx)
(K + 2x)2 (x+K + x)2
> 0


















= , which yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 4
We have
g (~p () ; ) =
a () 2
(1  )(1 + 2) +  and g
  ~pM () ;  = a () 2
2(1  ) +  ;
which implies that
H =   a (
)2 2(1  2)
8(1  )2(1 + 2) < 0:
Finally, straightforward computations yield
HM =   a (
)2 (1  2)
4(1  )2(1 + 2)2  
a () (1  2)





















Therefore, we obtain that
HM +HD +HI +H =
a () (1  2)
4(1  )(1 + 2)

a () (1 + 422)




The merger stimulates innovation if and only if
a () (1 + 422)
2(1  2)(1 + 2)(1  ) > : (12)
Using the fact that a() = +  and  = (1  )=2, condition (12) is equivalent to

(1 + 422)
2(1  2)(1 + 2)(1  ) > 

1  (1 + 4
22)














2 + 2(5  3)
2 [2  (2  )] :
Plotting the term (2 + 2(5  3))=(2  (2  )) shows that it is an increasing function of
.
Proof of Proposition 5
In the presence of spillovers, the counterparts to the rst-order conditions (1) and (2)
for the duopoly game are given by
(p  c) @Di
@pi










(p; p; ^; ^) = C 0 () ;
respectively.









(p; p; ^; ^) +Di (p; p; ^; ^) = 0;
and








(p; p; ^; ^) = C 0 () :
respectively.
These rst-order conditions show that the analysis leading to Proposition 1 in the base-
24To simplify the exposition, we assume away any synergies in production, i.e.,  = 0.
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, respectively, and the arguments (~p () ; ~p () ; ; ) and 
~pM () ; ~pM () ; ; 

are replaced with (~p (^) ; ~p (^) ; ^; ^) and
 




Sign of the strategic e¤ect on rivals price @~pj=@i













j ; 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
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where A  2@Di
@pi
+ (~p   c) @2Di
@p2i
, B  @Di
@pj
+ (~p   c) @2Di
@pi@pj
































 0. This implies in particular
that A < 0 < B, E < 0 < F , A+B < 0 and E+F < 0. It is straightforward to show that




Proof of Proposition 8
First, note that (1; 

2) is the unique solution of the following system of equations
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(
h1 (1; 2) = C
0
1 (1)










is the unique solution of:(
hM1 (1; 2) = C
0
1 (1)




Denote by R1 (2) the unique solution of h

1 (1; 2) = C
0
1 (1) in 1 (the uniqueness is
guaranteed by the assumption that h1 (1; 2) C 01 (1) is decreasing in 1) and by R2 (1)
the unique solution of h2 (1; 2) = C
0
2 (2) in 2. The functions R

1 (:) and R

2 (:) can be
interpreted as the pre-merger reaction functions of a game in which rms choose their
innovation levels and prices are set at their equilibrium levels.
Likewise, denote by RM1 (2) the unique solution of h
M
1 (1; 2) = C
0
1 (1) in 1 (the
uniqueness is guaranteed by Assumption 2) and byR2 (1) the unique solution of h

2 (1; 2) =
C
0







































(R1 (2) ; 2)
@h1
@2
(R1 (2) ; 2)  C 001 (R1 (2))
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(i) Assume that h1 (1; 2) is increasing in 2 and h

2 (1; 2) is increasing in 1, and
that hMi (1; 2) < h

i (1; 2) for i = 1; 2 and any (1; 2). This implies that R

1 (:) and
R2 (:) are increasing and that R

1 (2) > R
M
1 (2) and R

2 (1) > R
M
2 (1) for any 1; 2. To
see why the latter inequalities hold, notice that
hM1 (R

1 (2) ; 2) C 01 (R1 (2)) < h1 (R1 (2) ; 2) C 01 (R1 (2)) = 0 = hM1
 
RM1 (2) ; 2
 C 01  RM1 (2)
which, combined with the assumption that hM1 (1; 2)  C 01 (1) is decreasing in 1, leads
34
to R1 (2) > R
M
1 (2) :
Let us now show by way of contradiction that 1 > 
M
1 . Note rst that
R1 R2 (1) = 1:
Moreover, it holds that R1  R2 (1) > 1 for any 1 < 1 and R1  R2 (1) < 1 for any
1 > 

1. To see why, notice that if the latter inequalities did not hold, then the equation
R1 R2 (1) = 1 would have more than one solution because R1 R2 (0)  0, which would
mean that there is more than one equilibrium; that would violate Assumption 1.




  M1 :
However, since R1 (2) > R
M
1 (2) and R

2 (1) > R
M
2 (1) for any 1; 2, we have
R1 R2 (1) > RM1 RM2 (1)










which yields a contradiction. Hence, 1 > 
M





Part (ii) can be proven in the same way.
Condition under which the post-merger innovation e¤orts are strategic com-
plements in the Singh-Vives model
Consider the demand function
Di
 







  pi + pj
1  2 :
Denoting ai = + i and aj = + j, the post-merger rst-order condition with respect
to pi is
ai   aj  pi + pj   pi + ci +  (pj   cj) = 0;









Denoting Ai = + i   ci, the prot with optimal prices is






































(Ai   Aj)2 + AiAj
(1 + )3
:




































where  = 1  (1 + 2). Using the expressions of Ai and Aj, this condition can be written
as







It is easy to see that Condition (16) is more likely to hold the smaller  and the larger .
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